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Abstract. Two traditional paradigms are often used to describe the behavior of agents in multi-agent
complex systems. In the first one, agents are considered to be fully rational and systems are seen as
multi-player games. In the second one, agents are considered to be fully stochastic processes and the
system itself is seen as a large stochastic process. From the standpoint of a particular agent—having
to choose a strategy, the choice of the paradigm is crucial: the most adequate strategy depends on the
assumptions made on the other agents.
In this paper, we focus on two-player games and their application to the automated synthesis of reliable
controllers for reactive systems—a field at the crossroads between computer science and mathematics.
In this setting, the reactive system to control is a player, and its environment is its opponent, usually
assumed to be fully antagonistic or fully stochastic. We illustrate several recent developments aiming
to breach this narrow taxonomy by providing formal concepts and mathematical frameworks to reason
about richer behavioral models.
The interest of such models is not limited to reactive system synthesis but extends to other application
fields of game theory. The goal of our contribution is to give a high-level presentation of key concepts
and applications, aimed at a broad audience. To achieve this goal, we illustrate those rich behavioral
models on a classical challenge of the everyday life: planning a journey in an uncertain environment.
1 Introduction
Rationality. Ever since the seminal book of von Neumann and Morgenstern [37], game theory has grown
to be a prominent mathematical framework providing general and powerful concepts and methods to reason
about interactions between cooperating and/or competing agents in complex systems. Applications of game
theory are common in diverse fields such as computer science, mathematics, economics, biology, etc.
One of the core underlying concepts of game theory is the rationality hypothesis [24]: roughly speaking,
agents are modeled as players who have clear personal objectives, are aware of their alternatives, form sound
expectations about any unknowns, and choose their actions coherently (regarding some notion of optimality
with respect to the situation and the objective). In some sense, players are often seen as selfish beings who
place their personal benefit above the common good. This indeed led to a whole area of research where
mechanisms are sought to enforce that personal benefits coincide with the common good, thus giving a
natural incentive to players to behave in a not-so-selfish way. In the particular setting of zero-sum games,
this hypothesis generally results in antagonistic interactions between the players.
Rationality in computer science. While the very notion of agent rationality is often debated in appli-
cation fields such as social sciences and economics, there are areas where it is without any doubt a natural
hypothesis. One of such areas is our core research field of computer science. Indeed, computer processes for
example are fully rational agents: they behave according to a preset set of rules in order to achieve a well-
formalized objective, and interact in a usually predictable fashion. Similarly, it is quite common to model
their interaction through zero-sum games: e.g., processes competing for access to a shared resource. A very
promising application of game theory linked to computer science is the emerging field of reactive system
synthesis. In a nutshell, computer scientists are envisioning ways to automatically build provably-correct
and efficient controllers for so-called reactive systems (i.e., computer systems continuously interacting with
an uncontrollable environment). This building process, called synthesis, is based on strong mathematical
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grounds and aims to guarantee the correctness of the synthesized controller: this is notably of tremendous
importance for safety-critical systems (power plants, ABS for cars, airplane and railway traffic). At a very
high level, the game-theoretic formulation of the synthesis problem would be to consider a two-player zero-
sum game between the reactive system to control and the uncontrollable environment. The environment is
thus considered to be antagonistic and the goal is to find a strategy for the reactive system that guarantees
a correct behavior whatever the actions of the environment. If such a strategy exists, it provides a formal
model of the controller to implement. We describe this area in more details and with an illustrative example
in Sect. 2.
Stochasticity.While game theory is usually focused on rational players, other models have been proposed to
model large systems composed of autonomous agents. For example, considering agents as stochastic processes
is often a sufficient abstraction to reason about macroscopic properties of a complex system with adequate
accuracy. When every agent is assumed to be stochastic, the resulting system can itself be described by a
stochastic process, for example as a Markov chain [26]. A particularly interesting setting for this paper is
the one where a rational agent faces a stochastic one: this can be described as a Markov decision process,
combining both controllable and stochastic behaviors [26]. The gap between two-player games (i.e., two
rational agents) and Markov decision processes (i.e., one rational agent and one stochastic agent) is filled in
stochastic games which combine two rational agents and a stochastic one. Those are also called competitive
Markov decision processes in a seminal book by Filar and Vrieze [18].
The paradigm defines the objective hence the adequate strategy. Let us take a very simple example
to illustrate this. Assume you have to choose a way to get from your home to your workplace: you could take
your car, catch a bus, go to the railway station, ride your bike, etc. Maybe you could also take different routes.
In this example, you are the rational agent. Now, there is another agent: the environment. Essentially, this
agent represents everything that can impact your journey: bad weather, bad traffic, train delay, etc. What
assumptions should we make on this agent? If we are considering the average time-to-work, for example when
deciding whether to buy a car or a yearly train pass, the natural option would be to see the environment
as fully stochastic (following a stochastic model that we obtain from real data for example) and to reason
about the expected time-to-work as this is what we will observe in the long run. But if we are considering
which transportation to take on a particular day, for example the morning before a very important meeting,
then the situation is different: in this case, it seems reasonable to choose the option that will guarantee that
we will not be late, even if this option takes a little more time on average (e.g., traffic can be stopped for
a long time because of an accident even if the car is the best option on average). Such a situation is best
modeled through a two-player zero-sum game against the environment.
New paradigms. Those two paradigms are the prominent ones in the literature, especially for applications
in computer science. But they are not sufficient to reason about more complex situations, where richer
behavioral models have to be considered. For example, one may want to combine a good expected time-to-
work with acceptable guarantees on the worst-case reaching-time. To do so, we need appropriate mathematical
frameworks, algorithms and tools to decide the existence of adequate strategies and to exploit them.
Establishing such meaningful frameworks, both expressive enough to tackle the complexity of real-life
applications and abstract enough to allow efficient analysis, is a challenge which is gaining attention in
the research community. This paper tries to illustrate, at a very high level and for a large audience, some
advances in this area that we have obtained through different collaborations. It is based on a series of papers
on the subject [28,10,9,30,31,7], most in computer science conferences and journals.
Outline. As stated before, the aim of this contribution is to give a broad picture of several new solution
concepts for strategies, mixing assumptions of rationality and stochasticity. The paper only contains the
minimal amount of technical details necessary to ensure sound definitions of the different models and we
point in each section to the corresponding full papers containing detailed techniques. In Sect. 2, we give a
comprehensive discussion of the controller synthesis problem and how it can be answered using game theory.
To illustrate the approach, a toy example of a lawnmower controller is used as a case study. In Sect. 3,
we present the core of the paper: novel solution concepts for rich behavioral models, illustrated through an
everyday life application—the planning of a journey in an uncertain environment. We end the paper with a
short conclusion in Sect. 4.
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2 Context: controller synthesis for reactive systems
As mentioned in Sect. 1, our core research field is the automated synthesis of reliable and efficient controllers
for reactive systems through game theory. This section is based on [28]: its goal is to illustrate the cornerstones
of such an approach. It is organized as follows: Sect. 2.1 presents the general context in more details; Sect. 2.2
describes a motivating toy example—a robotized lawnmower— in an informal way; Sect. 2.3 shows how its
interaction with its environment can be formalized through game theory; and Sect. 2.4 discusses the synthesis
process and its outcome on the example.
2.1 Automated controller synthesis through game theory
Nowadays, more and more aspects of our society depend on critical reactive computer systems, i.e., systems
that continuously interact with their uncontrollable environment. Think about control programs of power
plants, ABS for cars or airplane and railway traffic managing. Therefore, we are in dire need of systems
capable of sustaining a safe behavior despite the nefarious effects of their environment.
Good developers know that testing do not capture the whole picture: never will it proves that no bug or
flaw is present in the considered system. So for critical systems, it is useful to apply formal verification.
That means using mathematical tools to prove that the system follows a given specification which models
desired behaviors. Among those tools are model checking techniques, introduced in the 80s [16,35,1] based
on logic, automata and games (seminal works by Bu¨chi, Rabin, etc). While verification applies a posteriori,
checking that the formal model of a system satisfies the needed specification, it is most of the time desirable
to start from the specification and automatically build a system from it, in such a way that desired properties
are proved to be maintained in the process. This a priori process is the more ambitious and harder synthesis
problem [15,27,25], on which an important part of the research community is currently focusing its effort.
The mathematical framework we use is game theory [37,24]. Roughly speaking, we consider a reactive
system controller as a player (player 1), and its uncontrollable environment as its adversary (player 2).
We model their interactions in a game on a graph [20], where vertices model states of the system and its
environment, and edges model their possible actions. Players alternatively decide how to move a pebble on
this graph. They choose how to move the pebble according to strategies, creating an infinite sequence of
states called play that represents the behavior of the system. The goal of the controller is to enforce a given
specification, encoded through a winning objective (a play is winning if it belongs to a predefined set of
acceptable plays). The goal of the environment, considered antagonistic, is to prevent the controller from
enforcing its specification. In our context, establishing winning strategies (i.e., strategies that guarantee
victory whatever the strategy of the environment) corresponds to synthesizing implementable models of
provably correct controllers.
The synthesis process is depicted in Fig. 1. In this section, we do not address the full theoretical deepness
of such an approach but rather try to motivate and illustrate its usefulness toward an audience who may not
be familiar with it, by discussing a motivating toy example.
A wide variety of games (and thus system models) have been studied recently, with diverse enforceable
behaviors (e.g., [20,11,4,17,38,36,13,12]). In our illustration, we focus on systems that must satisfy qualitative
behaviors (e.g., always eventually granting requests, never reaching a deadlock) along with multiple quan-
titative requirements (e.g., maintaining a bound on the mean response time, never running out of energy).
Such settings can be handled using techniques developed by Chatterjee et al. in [13].
2.2 A toy example: the lawnmower
Consider the following running example. We want to synthesize a controller for a robotized lawnmower. This
lawnmower is automatically operated, without any human intervention. We present its informal specification,
as well as the effects the environment can have on its operation.
– In this partial, simplified specification, the gardener does not ask for the lawnmower to satisfy any bound
on the frequency of grass-cuttings. However, as he wishes that the grass does not grow boundlessly, the
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Fig. 1. Controller synthesis through game theory: process.
lawnmower should cut the grass infinitely often in the future (as if it stops someday, the grass will not
stop growing from then on).
– The lawnmower has an electric battery that can be recharged under sunshine thanks to solar panels,
and a fuel tank that can only be filled when the lawnmower is back on its base. Both are considered
unbounded to keep things simple.
– The weather can be cloudy or sunny.
– The lawnmower can refuel (2 fuel units) at its base under both weather conditions, but can only recharge
its battery (2 battery units) when it is sunny. Resting at the base takes 20 time units.
– When cloudy, it can operate either under battery (1 battery unit) or using fuel (2 fuel units), both
according to the same speed (5 time units). When sunny, the lawnmower may either cut the grass slowly,
which always succeeds and consumes no energy (as the sun recharges the battery along the way), but
takes 10 time units. Or it may cut the grass fast, which consumes both 1 unit of fuel and 1 unit of
battery, but only takes 2 time units.
– When operating fast, the lawnmower makes considerably much noise, which may wake up the cat that
resides in the garden and prompt it to attack the lawnmower. In that case, the grass-cutting is interrupted
and the lawnmower goes back to its base, losing 40 time units as repair is needed. The cat does not go
out if the weather is bad.
– As the gardener cannot benefit from his garden while the lawnmower is operating, he wishes that the
mean time required by actions of the lawnmower is less than 10 time units.
While simple, this toy example already involves qualitative requirements (the grass should be mown
infinitely often), along with quantitative ones. There are indeed three quantities that have to be taken into
account: battery and fuel are energy quantities, which should never be exhausted, and time is a quantity
which mean over an infinite operating of the lawnmower should be less than a given bound.
4
Given this informal description of the capabilities of the system and its environment, as well as the
specification the system should enforce, we need to build a system controller that guarantees satisfaction of
the specification.
2.3 Modeling the lawnmower example as a two-player game
Game. We model the states and the interactions of the couple system/environment as a graph game where
the system (here, the lawnmower) is player 1 and the environment is its adversary player 2. Formally, a
game is a tuple G = (S1, S2, sinit, E, w) where (i) S1 and S2 resp. denote the finite sets of states belonging
to player 1 and player 2, with S1 ∩ S2 = ∅; (ii) sinit ∈ S = S1 ∪ S2 is the initial state; (iii) E ⊆ S × S is
the set of edges such that for all s ∈ S, there exists s′ ∈ S such that (s, s′) ∈ E; and (iv) w : E → Zd is the
d-dimensional weight labeling function.
The game starts at the initial state sinit, and if the current state is a player 1 (resp. player 2) state,
then player 1 (resp. player 2) chooses an outgoing edge. This choice is made according to a strategy of the
player: given the sequence of visited states, a strategy chooses an outgoing edge. For this illustration, we
only consider strategies that operate this choice deterministically. This process of choosing edges is repeated
forever, and gives rise to an outcome of the game, called a play, that consists in the infinite sequence of
states that are visited. Formally, a play in game G is an infinite sequence of states π = s0s1s2 . . . such that
s0 = sinit and for all i ≥ 0, we have (si, si+1) ∈ E.
Applying this formalism, we represent the lawnmower problem as the game depicted on Fig. 2. Edges
correspond to choices of the system or its environment and taking an edge implies a change on the three
considered quantities, as denoted by the edge label. The grass-cutting state is special as the specification
requires that it should be visited infinitely often by a suitable controller.
cloudy base sunny
cat
attack
grass
cutting
use
fuel
cloudy
(0, 0, 0)
sunny
(0, 0, 0)
fast mow
(−1,−1, 2)
go back
(0, 0, 0)
mow battery
(−1, 0, 5)switch to fuel
(0, 0, 0)
mow fuel
(0,−2, 5)
slow mow
(0, 0, 10)
no cat
(0, 0, 0)
rest
(0, 2, 20)
rest
(2, 2, 20)
cat
(0, 0, 40)
Fig. 2. Lawnmower game. Edges are fitted with tuples denoting changes in battery, fuel and time respectively.
Strategies. Formally, a strategy for player i, i ∈ {1, 2}, in G is a function σi : S∗Si → S defined over all
valid prefixes of plays (w.r.t. the underlying game graph) and such that for all prefix η = s0s1 . . . sn with
sn ∈ Si, we have (sn, σi(η)) ∈ E. The history of a play (i.e., the previously visited states and their order of
appearance) may thus in general be used by a strategy to prescribe its choice. In full generality, strategies may
require infinite memory (as they need to recall histories of unbounded length). A strategy σi for player i has
finite memory if the history it needs to remember can be bounded. In that case, the strategy can be encoded
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by a specal kind of finite automaton, called deterministic Moore machine. As discussed earlier, a strategy
of player 1 (the lawnmower) provides a complete description of a controller for the system, prescribing the
actions to take in response to any situation. Therefore, our task is to build a strategy that satisfies the
specification.
Objectives. To devise such a strategy, it is needed to formalize the specification as objectives for player 1
in the game. The conjunction of objectives yields a set of winning plays that endorse the specification. A
strategy of player 1 is thus said to be winning if, against every possible strategy of the adversary, the play
induced by following this strategy belongs to the winning set of plays.
The informal specification developed in Sect. 2.2 is encoded as the following objectives. We omit technical
details for the sake of this illustration.
– Battery and fuel. Both constitute energy types which quantities are never allowed to drop below zero.
A play is thus winning for the energy objective if the running sum of the weights encountered along it
(i.e., changes induced by the taken edges) never drops below zero on any of the first two dimensions.
– Mean action time. The specification asks that the lawnmower spends no more than 10 time units per
action on average in the long run. That is, it is allowed to take more than 10 time units on some actions,
but the long-run mean should be below this threshold. Therefore, the mean-payoff objective requires that
the limit of the mean of the third-dimension weights over prefixes of a play is lower than 10.
– Infinitely frequent grass-cutting. To satisfy this part of the specification, a strategy of player 1 must
ensure that the grass-cutting state is visited infinitely often along the induced play. This is encoded as
a Bu¨chi objective.
2.4 Synthesis of a correct and efficient controller
Process. Since in this example, our desire is to build a practical real-world controller, we are only interested
in strategies that require finite memory. From a theoretical standpoint, there exist classes of games where
infinite memory may help to achieve better results (see for example [36,29]), but infinite-memory strategies
are ill-suited for practical use, as implementing a controller with infinite-memory capabilities is ruled out.
The core of the synthesis process depicted on Fig. 1 is thus to construct, if possible, a finite-memory
strategy that ensures satisfaction of the previously defined objectives, as well as a corresponding initial value
of the energy parameters, commonly referred to as initial credit. That is because for the energy objectives,
it is allowed to start the game with some finite quantity in stock, before taking any action. Think about
starting a race with some fuel in your tank.
While of importance for the analysis of systems with both qualitative and quantitative requirements,
the synthesis problem for the class of games that is used to model the lawnmower problem, i.e., games
with parity and multi energy or mean-payoff objectives, has only been considered recently [13]. Applying
the corresponding techniques, we are able to synthesize a winning strategy for player 1, hence a suitable
controller for the lawnmover.
Lawnmower controller. To conclude our illustration, we exhibit a synthesized controller that enforces the
desired specification. Notice that there may exist other acceptable controllers. The one we present here is
quite simple but already asks for some memory (in the form of bookkeeping of battery and fuel levels). The
controller implements the following strategy.
– Start the game with empty battery and fuel levels.
– If the weather is sunny, mow slowly.
– If the weather is cloudy,
• if there is at least one unit of battery, mow on battery,
• otherwise, if there is at least two units of fuel, mow on fuel,
• otherwise, rest at the base.
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Notice that this strategy guarantees never running out of energy (which satisfies the energy objectives),
induces infinitely frequent grass-cuttings (which satisfies the Bu¨chi objective), and produces a play on which
the mean time per action is less than 10 against any strategy of the adversary (which satisfies the mean-payoff
objective). In this sample controller, the lawnmower never uses the “fast mow” action as the adversary could
very well play “cat” and prevent visit of the grass-cutting state.
2.5 Typical questions and challenges
The lawnmower illustration is only a toy example, too simple to be of real practical use. Nonetheless, the
underlying synthesis techniques aim at dealing with real-world problems, and some of them already proved
their interest in industrial contexts. The typical challenges faced in the field are the following.
First, in order to accurately represent the complexity of practical applications, our game models must be
sufficiently expressive. The needed expressiveness may be in terms of complex winning objectives (e.g., [12,6]),
of the capacity to analyze trade-offs between different objectives (e.g., [13,30]), of rich interaction between
the players [7], and so on. In Sect. 3, we focus on recent advances toward richer behavioral models [9,10,31].
Second, modeling real applications usually results in huge games, while allowing our techniques to describe
complex behavior results in increased computational complexity. For example, it was shown in [13] that
synthesizing correct controllers for specifications similar to the lawnmower one requires exponential time in
the size of the game. Moreover, optimal controllers for such specifications also require exponential memory. In
practice, we favor simpler controllers whenever possible: they are easier to conceive, and cheaper to produce
and maintain. Therefore, to preserve the practical interest of synthesis techniques, it is crucial to consider
the trade-off between expressiveness and tractability of the resulting techniques.
Similarly, it is important that the developed theoretical frameworks and algorithms are then implemented
efficiently in software tools supporting the synthesis process. This point yields its own challenges, and a lot
of effort is put in devising efficient representations and techniques to implement game-theoretic concepts.
For example, see [5] for implementation of techniques linked to the lawnmower case.
3 Rich behavioral models
As argued in Sect. 1, for a rational agent having to adopt a strategy in a multi-agent complex system, the
best choice greatly depends on the assumptions made on the other agents. This is especially true in two-
player games such as the ones used for synthesis, as presented in Sect. 2. Here, we develop the practical case
sketched in the introduction: the dilemma of an employee having to choose a way to get to work. We show
that, depending on the situation, the natural objective of the employee and the assumptions he should make
on his environment vary. Then, we illustrate novel concepts that go beyond the two traditional paradigms
of fully antagonistic and fully stochastic environments.
This section is based on a more technical survey co-authored with Raskin and Sankur [31]. The goal
of this section is to illustrate the different concepts intuitively, abstracting most technical details to focus
on the philosophy of each solution concept. For each one, we point the interested reader to corresponding
publications where the models are formally defined and adequate synthesis techniques are developed. This
section is structured as follows:
– Sect. 3.1 presents the practical case and defines the necessary notions of the model;
– Sect. 3.2 presents a classical solution consisting in minimizing the expected time-to-work, assuming the
environment to be fully stochastic;
– Sect. 3.3 addresses the case of risk-averse strategies;
– Sect. 3.4 shows how to guarantee an acceptable worst-case reaching-time by considering the environment
as fully antagonistic;
– Sect. 3.5 presents a novel framework allowing the employee to adopt a strategy ensuring both worst-case
guarantees and good expected time-to-work.
– Finally, Sect. 3.6 sketches new concepts that permit reasoning on trade-offs between different aspects:
e.g., the employee wants to minimize the risk of being late but also to travel at an acceptable cost.
7
3.1 Planning a journey in an uncertain environment
A
B
C
D
E
30
10
20
5
10
20
5
Fig. 3. In a fully deterministic world,
traveling would be as easy as finding a
shortest path in a graph.
An everyday life challenge. Let us consider the dilemma of an
employee choosing a mean of transport and an itinerary to get to
work. This kind of choice is one that we all face at times, some sort
of shortest path problem: we want to find the quickest way to go from
one place to another. The usual way to solve this in the real life is to
resort to a GPS navigation device or our favorite web mapping service.
Behind the scenes, such a problem is often modeled as finding a path
of minimal length in a weighted graph (which may be directed or not).
See for example Fig. 3: vertices represent different locations and edges
L → L′ are labeled with a weight that models the time to go from
L to L′. The problem is then to find a path from the origin (A) to
the destination (D) that minimizes the sum of weights (this path is
depicted in thick red in the figure). This is a well-known algorithmic
problem with elegant solutions (e.g., Dijkstra and Bellman-Ford algorithms [14]). But, is it really always
that easy? It would be if we lived in a fully deterministic world, where going from A to B always take the
same precise amount of time. But we all know that uncontrollable events can impact a journey: bad traffic
can slow our car, trains can be delayed, etc. So, what can we do?
Modeling an uncertain environment. One traditional answer to this observation is to go from a model
where the employee is the only agent with choices (a graph) to a model where a second agent represents the
environment and interacts with the employee. As discussed earlier, two classical assumptions can be made
on the environment: either we see it as a rational agent (yielding a two-player game) or as a stochastic agent
(yielding a Markov decision process). In our case, the environment represents traffic, weather, etc. While it
may sometimes seem like other people are taking the road only to slow us down, it is reasonable to assume
that the environment is not a rational agent per se. On the contrary, a stochastic agent is a good model
of such phenomena: one can obtain data estimating the probability that a specific part of town is crowded
at specific times of the day, the probability that a bus on a given line is delayed, and so on. Hence for the
moment, we consider the environment to be fully stochastic and the problem to solve becomes a stochastic
shortest path problem [26]. Still, the very notion of rationality should not be ruled out for the environment:
we will see that even if the environment is inherently stochastic, the employee sometimes has to see it as
a rational, antagonistic agent in order to choose adequate strategies, achieving complex winning objectives
(see Sect. 3.4 and Sect. 3.5).
Toy example. A simple example of a Markov decision process modeling the rational employee faced to a
stochastic environment is depicted in Fig. 4. Vertices model situations in which the employee usually has
several choices, represented by outgoing edges. For example, at home, he has the possibility to go to the
train station, to take his car or to take his bicycle. His goal is to reach work. Each action has a name, an
integer label representing the time taken by the action, and may result in different outcomes according to a
discrete probability distribution, modeling the stochastic environment. For example, if the employee decides
to take his car (1 minute), then the journey depends on traffic conditions and may result—with respective
probability 0.2, 0.7 and 0.1— in a 20-minute, 30-minute or 70-minute drive. When he decides to bike, he
reaches his office in 45 minutes: this action is deterministic, not impacted by the environment. Finally, the
employee can also try to catch a train, which takes 35 minutes to reach work. But trains can be delayed
(potentially multiple times): in that case, the employee decides if he waits or if he goes back home (and then
takes his car or his bike).
We give the formal definition of Markov decision processes and related notions in the following. Informally,
Markov decision processes can be seen as two-player games against a stochastic adversary (i.e., the opponent
adopts a fixed randomized strategy known to the rational agent). Indeed, they are sometimes called 1 12 -player
games (the half-player being the stochastic one).
Markov decision processes. A Markov decision process (MDP) is a tuple D = (S, sinit, A, δ, w) where (i) S
is a finite set of states ; (ii) sinit ∈ S is the initial state,; (iii) A is a finite set of actions ; (iv) δ : S×A→ D(S)
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Fig. 4. An everyday life application of stochastic shortest path problems: choosing a mean of transport to go from
home to work. Actions (black dots) are labeled with durations in minutes, and stochastic transitions are labeled with
their probability.
is a partial function called the probabilistic transition function, where D(S) denotes the set of rational
probability distributions over S; and (v) w : A → Zd is a d-dimensional weight function. The set of actions
that are available in a state s ∈ S is denoted by A(s). For any dimension i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, we denote by
wi : A→ Z the projection of w to the i-th dimension, i is omitted when there is only one dimension.
We define a run ρ of D as an infinite sequence ρ = s1a1 . . . an−1sn . . . of states and actions such that
δ(si, ai)(si+1) > 0 for all i ≥ 1. Essentially, runs in MDPs are analogous to plays in games.
Strategies. As for games, strategies are defined over all valid prefixes of runs (w.r.t. the underlying graph).
Two differences here: first there is only one player in an MDP, the rational agent; second, we allow strategies
to use randomness in addition to memory. Therefore, a strategy σ is a function (SA)∗S → D(A) such that
for all prefix η = s1a1 . . . an−1sn, we have Supp(σ(η)) ⊆ A(sn), where Supp denotes the support of the
probability distribution. As for games, we are interested in the complexity of strategies: whether we need no
memory, finite memory or infinite memory; whether we need to use randomness or not.
In order to properly define the different solution concepts proposed in the following, we need to introduce
two additional notions: induced Markov chains and the truncated sum payoff function.
Markov chains induced by a strategy. When fixing the strategy σ of the rational agent in an MDP,
the resulting process is fully stochastic and is called a Markov chain (MC). We omit technical details here
(the interested reader will find exhaustive discussion in [26,18,1]). Markov chains are essentially MDPs where
for all s ∈ S, we have that |A(s)| = 1. Given an MDP D and a strategy σ, let Dσ be the induced MC.
Assuming σ uses only finite memory, then Dσ is also finite.
In this MC Dσ, an event is a measurable set of runs E . Every event has a uniquely defined probability [34]:
we denote by PσD(E) the probability that a run of the MDP D belongs to E when the player follows strategy σ.
Given a measurable function f mapping runs to the numerical domain, we denote by EσD(f) the expected
value or expectation of f over runs in D induced by strategy σ.
Truncated sum payoff. Let D = (S, sinit, A, δ, w) be an MDP with a single-dimensional weight function
w : A→ N0 that assigns to each action a ∈ A a strictly positive integer. Let T ⊆ S be a set of target states.
Given a run ρ = s1s2 . . . si . . . , with s1 = sinit, in the MDP, we define its truncated sum up to T to be
TST (ρ) =
∑n−1
j=1 w(aj) if sn is the first visit of a state in T ⊆ S within ρ; otherwise if T is never reached,
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then we set TST (ρ) =∞. The function TST is measurable, and so this function has an expected value in an
MC and sets of runs defined from TST are measurable.
Intuitively, we consider graphs where all actions induce strictly positive costs and the truncated sum
function computes the sum of the weights up to the first visit of a designated target T : this is exactly what
we need to model the shortest path problem. In the following, we survey several solution concepts of interest
for this problem.
3.2 Solution concept S1: minimizing the expected time-to-work
As mentioned in Sect. 1, the most traditional approach to decision-making in such a stochastic environment is
to reason about the expected payoff, thus in our case (Fig. 4), to choose the mean of transport that minimizes
the expected time-to-work. Such a problem can be formalized as follows.
Definition 1 (Problem S1). Given a single-dimensional weighted MDP D = (S, sinit, A, δ, w) and a thresh-
old ℓ ∈ N, decide if there exists σ such that EσD(TS
T ) ≤ ℓ.
This problem is well-studied in the literature, and one can prove that deciding the existence of a strategy
achieving an expected time-to-work less than a given threshold can be done in polynomial time, and that
such a strategy is simple: it is pure (i.e., does not require randomness) and memoryless (i.e., it depends only
on the current state). In layman’s terms, this solution concept is easy to handle and produced strategies are
very simple. Formal discussion of this problem can be found in [3].
Theorem 1 ([3]). Problem S1 can be decided in polynomial time. Optimal pure memoryless strategies always
exist and can be constructed in polynomial time.
Solution S1
σ: take the car.
EσD(TS
T ) = 33 minutes.
In our practical case, it turns out that taking the car is the strategy that minimizes the expected time-
to-work : this choice gives an expectation equal to 33 minutes. Adopting such a strategy makes sense if one
thinks about regular travels, for example when deciding whether to buy a car or a yearly train pass. Indeed,
in the long run, the observed average time-to-work will be quite close to expectation.
3.3 Solution concept S2: traveling without taking too many risks
Observe that taking the car presents some risk: if the traffic is heavy, then work is only reached after 71
minutes. This can be unacceptable for the employee’s boss if it happens too frequently. So if the employee
is risk-averse, optimizing the expectation may not be the best choice. For example, the employee may want
to reach work within 40 minutes with high probability, say 95%. In this case, we need to solve a different
problem, called a percentile problem.
Definition 2 (Problem S2). Given a single-dimensional weighted MDP D = (S, sinit, A, δ, w), value ℓ ∈ N,
and probability threshold α ∈ [0, 1]∩Q, decide if there exists a strategy σ such that PσD
[
{ρ | TST (ρ) ≤ ℓ}
]
≥ α.
This problem is also well-studied in the literature [23,32,33,21,30]. Unfortunately, it is more complex to
solve than problem S1: it can be proved that computing an adequate strategy this objective requires pseudo-
polynomial time, i.e., exponential time in the length of the binary encoding of the weights. Furthermore, in
general the corresponding strategies also require exponential memory.
Theorem 2. Problem S2 can be decided in pseudo-polynomial time, and it is PSPACE-hard. Optimal pure
strategies with exponential memory always exist and can be constructed in exponential time.
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Solution S2
σ: take the train and always wait.
PσD
[
{ρ | TST (ρ) ≤ ℓ}
]
= 0.99.
First, observe that taking the train ensures to reach work within 40 minutes in 99% of the runs. Indeed,
if the train is not delayed, we reach work with 37 minutes, and this happens with probability 9/10. Now, if
the train is late and the employee decides to wait, the train arrives in the next 3 minutes with probability
9/10: in that case, the employee arrives at work within 40 minutes. So, the strategy consisting in going to
the railway station and waiting for the train (as long as needed) gives us a probability 99/100 to reach work
within 40 minutes, fulfilling our objective.
Second, it is easy to see that both bicycle and car are excluded in order to satisfy the problem S2. With
the bicycle we reach work in 45 minutes with probability one, and with the car we reach work in 71 minutes
with probability 1/10, hence we miss the constraint of 40 minutes too often.
3.4 Solution concept S3: strict worst-case guarantees
Assume now that the employee wants a strategy to go from home to work such that work is guaranteed
to be reached within 60 minutes (e.g., to avoid missing an important meeting with his boss). It is clear
that both previously defined optimal (w.r.t. problems S1 and S2 respectively) strategies are excluded: there
is the possibility of heavy traffic with the car (and a journey of 71 minutes), and trains can be delayed
indefinitely in the worst case. While the probability of such an event is actually zero, the mere existence of
the corresponding run is still not acceptable when reasoning about worst-case behaviors. Moreover, whatever
the threshold fixed on the acceptable time-to-work, the train option will exceed it with positive—yet very
small—probability.
To ensure a strict upper bound on the reaching-time, an adequate model is to bring back rationality to
the environment and to consider it, not anymore as a stochastic agent, but as an antagonistic opponent. The
result is a two-player zero-sum game as in Sect. 2, where the uncertainty becomes adversarial: when there
is some uncertainty about the outcome of an action, we do not consider a probabilistic model but we let an
adversary decide the outcome of the action. The problem is defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Problem S3). Given single-dimensional weighted MDP D = (S, sinit, A, δ, w), set of target
states T ⊆ S, and value ℓ ∈ N, decide if there exists a strategy σ such that for all run ρ, we have that
TST (ρ) ≤ ℓ.
In this case, we again find an easy setting: polynomial time suffices to decide if an adequate strategy
exists, and such strategies require neither memory nor randomness. More details can be found in [8,19,12].
Theorem 3 ([22]). Problem S3 can be decided in polynomial time. Optimal pure memoryless strategies
always exist and can be constructed in polynomial time.
Solution S3
σ: take the bicycle.
Worst-case reaching-time: 45 minutes.
If we apply this technique to our running example, we obtain that taking the bicycle is a safe option to
ensure the strict 60 minutes upper bound. Indeed, its worst-case reaching-time is 45 minutes. However, the
expected time-to-work when following this strategy is also 45 minutes, which is far from the optimum of 33
minutes that can be obtained when we neglect the worst-case constraint (solution S1). The goal of the next
solution concept is exactly to find a strategy allying the best aspects of solutions S1 and S3.
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3.5 Solution concept S4: minimizing the expected time under strict worst-case guarantees
In answer to the previous situation, the employee may be interested in synthesizing a strategy that minimizes
the expected time-to-work under the constraint that work is reached within 60 minutes in the worst case. This
is a complex objective which cannot be expressed in the traditional frameworks. Intuitively, it combines two
different views of the environment: for the expected value, the environment is seen as a stochastic agent,
while for the worst case, it is seen as a rational antagonistic agent. In that sense, it constitutes an example
of what we call rich behavioral models.
In recent joint work [9,10], we developed sound formal grounds for the analysis of such complex objectives.
We called the corresponding problem the beyond worst-case synthesis problem. Its goal is to look for strategies
that ensure, simultaneously, a worst-case threshold (when probabilities are replaced by adversarial choices),
and a good expectation (when probabilities are taken into account). It is formally defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Problem S4). Given a single-dimensional weighted MDP D = (S, sinit, A, δ, w), a set of
target states T ⊆ S, and two values ℓ1, ℓ2 ∈ N, decide if there exists a strategy σ such that:
1. For all induced run ρ, TST (ρ) ≤ ℓ1,
2. EσD(TS
T ) ≤ ℓ2.
This problem can be seen as a generalization subsuming both problems S1 and S3. While those problems
are both solvable in polynomial time and pure memoryless strategies suffice in both cases, problem S4 proves
to be inherently harder. We showed that, similarly to problem S2, pseudo-polynomial time is necessary to
construct winning strategies and those strategies require memory (but no randomness). Extensive discussion
of this novel framework and ad-hoc techniques can be found in [9,10].
Theorem 4 ([10]). Problem S4 can be decided in pseudo-polynomial time and is NP-hard. Pseudo-poly-
nomial memory is always sufficient and in general necessary, and satisfying strategies can be constructed in
pseudo-polynomial time.
Solution S4
σ: try to take the train, if the train is delayed three times
consecutively, then go back home and take the bicycle.
EσD(TS
T ) ≈ 37.34 minutes.
Worst-case reaching-time: 58 minutes.
For our employee, the optimal strategy w.r.t. problem S4 is the following: try to take the train, if the
train is delayed three times consecutively, then go back home and take the bicycle. This strategy is safe as
it always reaches work within 58 minutes and its expectation is ≈ 37.34 minutes (much better than taking
directly the bicycle). Hence, this a perfectly suitable choice for the employee. However, it comes at a cost in
terms of strategy complexity: observe that this strategy requires finite memory (because the employee must
be able to recall how many times the train has been delayed already), in contrast to solutions S1 and S3.
3.6 Solution concept S5: trade-offs between multiple objectives
The last solution concept we describe will be illustrated on a different example. The MDP on Fig. 5 represents
a simplified choice model for commuting, but introduces two-dimensional weights: each action is labeled with
a duration, in minutes, and a cost, in dollars. Multi-dimensional MDPs are useful to analyze systems with
multiple objectives that are potentially conflicting and make necessary the analysis of trade-offs. For instance,
we may want a choice of transportation that gives us high probability to reach work in due time but also
limits the risk of an expensive journey. Since faster options are often more expensive, trade-offs have to be
considered.
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Fig. 5. Multi-constraint percentile queries can help when actions both impact the duration of the journey (first
dimension) and its cost (second dimension): trade-offs have to be considered.
Recall problem S2: it asks to decide the existence of strategies satisfying a single percentile constraint. As
all models discussed up to now, this problem can only be applied to single-dimensional MDPs. For example,
one may look for a strategy that ensures that 80% of the runs take at most 40 minutes (constraint C1), or
that 50% of them cost at most 10 dollars (C2). A good strategy for C1 would be to take the taxi, which
guarantees that work is reached within 10 minutes with probability 0.99 > 0.8. For C2, taking the bus is a
good option, because already 70% of the runs will reach work for only 3 dollars. Note that taking the taxi
does not satisfy C2, nor does taking the bus satisfy C1.
In practice, a desirable strategy should be able to satisfy both C1 and C2. This is the goal of our model
of multi-constraint percentile queries, introduced in [30]. It can be formalized as follows.
Definition 5 (Problem S5). Given a d-dimensional weighted MDP D = (S, sinit, A, δ, w), and q ∈ N
percentile constraints described by sets of target states Ti ⊆ S, dimensions ki ∈ {1, . . . , d}, value thresholds
ℓi ∈ N and probability thresholds αi ∈ [0, 1]∩Q, where i ∈ {1, . . . , q}, decide if there exists a strategy σ such
that
∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , q}, PσD
[
{ρ | TSTiki (ρ) ≤ ℓi}
]
≥ αi
where TSTiki denotes the truncated sum on dimension ki and w.r.t. target set Ti.
Our technique is able to solve the problem for queries with multiple constraints, potentially related to
different dimensions of the weight function and to different target sets: this offers great flexibility which is
useful in modeling practical applications. In terms of complexity, two things should be noted. First, while
significantly more expressive than problem S2, this problem does not induce a blow-up in complexity: the
algorithmic complexity and the memory needs for strategies are similar. Second, among the solution concepts
presented in this paper, problem S5 is the only one that actually requires strategies to use randomness in
full generality.
Theorem 5 ([30]). Problem S5 can be decided in exponential time in general, and pseudo-polynomial time
for single-dimension single-target multi-constraint queries. The problem is PSPACE-hard even for single-
constraint queries. Randomized exponential-memory strategies are always sufficient and in general necessary,
and satisfying strategies can be constructed in exponential time.
Solution S5
σ: try the bus once, then take the taxi if the bus does not depart.
PσD
[
{ρ | TST1 (ρ) ≤ 40}
]
> 0.99.
PσD
[
{ρ | TST2 (ρ) ≤ 10}
]
= 0.7.
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Let us see what can be an appropriate strategy for the conjunction (C1 ∧ C2) in our example. One is to
try the bus once, and then take the taxi if the bus does not depart. Indeed, this strategy ensures that work
is reached within 40 minutes with probability larger than 0.99 thanks to runs home·bus·work (probability
0.7 and duration 30) and home·bus·home·taxi·work (probability 0.297 and duration 40). Furthermore, it
also ensures that more than half the time, the total cost to target is at most 10 dollars, thanks to run
home·bus·work which has probability 0.7 and cost 3. Observe that this strategy requires memory.
Solution S5
σ′: take the bus (resp. the taxi) with probability 3/5 (resp. 2/5).
PσD
[
{ρ | TST1 (ρ) ≤ 40}
]
> 0.81.
PσD
[
{ρ | TST2 (ρ) ≤ 10}
]
> 0.5.
In this particular example, it is possible to build another acceptable strategy which is memoryless
but requires randomness. Consider the strategy that flips an unfair coin in home to decide if we take
the bus or the taxi, with probabilities 3/5 and 2/5 respectively. Constraint C1 is ensured thanks to runs
home·bus·work (probability 0.42) and home·taxi·work (probability 0.396). Constraint C2 is ensured thanks
to runs (home·bus)n·work with n = 1, 2, 3: they have probabilities 0.42, ≥ 0.07 and ≥ 0.01 respectively,
totaling to ≥ 0.5, while they all have cost at most 3 · 3 = 9 < 10.
4 Conclusion
Through this contribution, we discussed two traditional paradigms used for describing the behavior of agents
in complex systems: rationality and stochasticity. Both have proved to be powerful abstraction mechanisms
in many contexts. The main point of this paper is that it is sometimes necessary to bring together these two
paradigms in rich behavioral models.
Our core research field is controller synthesis for reactive systems, hence the models we develop often
arise from problems linked to computer systems. In Sect. 2, we gave an overview of the application of game
theory for controller synthesis, highlighting the crux of the approach and the main challenges.
In Sect. 3, we surveyed five solution concepts, illustrated on an everyday life example: how to plan a
journey in an uncertain environment. We presented three classical approaches, based on the traditional
dichotomy between rational and stochastic environments, and then discussed recent advances breaching this
dichotomy. The simple examples presented in the paper are already sufficient to witness that such rich
behavioral models do have great practical interest.
Our presentation was at a very high level, aimed at a broad audience, but the reader interested in actual
mathematical models, algorithms and tools will hopefully find more information in the corresponding cited
papers. It is also worth noting that all concepts presented here for the shortest path are indeed applicable
in various, more general frameworks (e.g., many other payoff functions have been studied).
While our work is motivated by applications to controller synthesis, we are led to believe that such models
can also prove interesting in other areas. For example, related models have been used in economics [2] to
model investor profiles as strategies in games with stochastic aspects. With that in mind, beyond worst-case
strategies (solution concept S4) that ensure both sufficient risk-avoidance and profitable expected return can
be of interest, as well as related models of value-at-risk [30,31].
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